China's MSS ran a secret two-year campaign to obtain banned AI chips, NYT investigation finds
China's Ministry of State Security has spent at least two years running a secret campaign to help Chinese companies acquire and smuggle advanced AI chips barred by US export controls, led by a working group reporting directly to MSS chief Chen Yixin, who in April called for a deeper struggle against Western blockades and focus on technological chokeholds, the New York Times reported citing serving and former intelligence officials. The reporting ties the effort to the Alice Huang case and Singapore-based Megaspeed's overseas data-center channel, just as the Trump administration moves to require licences for foreign data centers serving Chinese companies within about 90 days. Beijing calls the espionage claims pure fabrication.

China's Ministry of State Security has spent at least two years running a secret campaign to help Chinese companies obtain and smuggle AI chips banned by US export controls, according to a New York Times investigation, with a working group reporting directly to MSS chief Chen Yixin leading the effort 1. The campaign also collected intelligence on the global chip industry and its supply chains, the Times reported, citing serving and former security and intelligence officials from Asia, the US and Europe
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The quiet finding sits on the American side of the ledger. In the window the campaign ran, US enforcement brought its biggest chip cases, and none of the three targeted a blacklisted buyer. They targeted middlemen: a roughly $2.5 billion smuggling indictment against Supermicro co-founder Yih-Shyan "Wally" Liaw and a Justice Department investigation into the Singapore data-centre company Megaspeed 3. Running alongside the enforcement cases, intelligence firm Strider Technologies traced roughly $3.6 billion in Chinese government funding through companies tied to the family or business associates of Alice Huang, the Chinese businesswoman at the center of the Nvidia scandal
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The leak sits at the distribution layer, not the entities list
Every case shares one shape: the accused sat inside the legitimate supply chain. Prosecutors say Liaw routed about $2.5 billion in servers carrying Nvidia H200 and B200 processors to China through a Bangkok front company; Supermicro says it was a victim of the scheme, and Liaw has pleaded not guilty 3. Megaspeed, which Alice Huang ran, bought billions of dollars of Nvidia chips and sold the resulting computing power to Chinese companies through data centres outside China; US officials are now examining whether it also supplied chips to data centres linked to Chinese military research, and the precise nature of Huang's role in the MSS campaign remains unclear
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2. The MSS campaign worked the same channels it found already flowing: help firms acquire and smuggle restricted chips, gather supply-chain intelligence, keep Chinese firms supplied with foreign compute. "MSS is very comfortable using business covers," Alex Joske, managing director of Garnaut Global, a consultancy that studies China's security apparatus, told the Times
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Nvidia's own filings cannot see past the middleman: its latest quarterly report states that the end customer and shipping location may differ from the direct customer's headquarters 5. An entity list decides whether a named company may buy. It is silent about the partner who resells, the broker who ships, and the operator who rents the same silicon onward.
Four years from the first ban to the rule that closes the rental lane
No single report prints the sequence in order. Assembled across five outlets, it runs:
- Late 2022: the US begins restricting advanced Nvidia chip exports to China; Chen Yixin becomes China's state security minister in the same season
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- 2023: Xi Jinping stands up the Central Science and Technology Commission, led by Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang, to mobilise labs and companies around technological self-reliance
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- By late 2024 at the latest: the MSS campaign is underway, on the investigation's two-year floor
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- April 2025: Washington requires licences for Nvidia's China-market H20 chip; Nvidia books a $4.5 billion charge, and its reported China revenue share falls from 21.9% to 8.5% in one quarter
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- March 2026: federal prosecutors charge Liaw and two others in the roughly $2.5 billion case
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- April 2026: Chen writes in a Communist Party journal that the agency must deepen the "struggle against blockades" and focus on the "chokeholds" of critical technologies
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- May 31 2026: Commerce extends licence requirements to entities headquartered in China even when they sit abroad
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- November 2026: Jensen Huang resigns as Nvidia chief executive after reports of his relationship with Alice Huang, as research firm SemiAnalysis says it has tracked more than 1.5 gigawatts of export-restricted Nvidia chips that should not be in China
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- November 16 2026: Commerce issues an interim final rule giving overseas data centres that serve companies headquartered in China, Russia, Iran and other listed countries about 90 days, roughly to mid-February 2027, to obtain licences
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Count the window: the offshore rental channel that Megaspeed sold through stayed open for roughly four years after the first ban, and it closes only in February 2027 if the 90-day clock holds. Each prior control round refined who may buy. The campaign spent those same years answering a different question: who will sell, host and rent.
For anyone selling compute, vetting is now the product
The November 16 rule moves the control point from the chipmaker to the operator: a data centre outside China now needs a US licence before supplying significant computing power to China-headquartered customers, and the burden lands on whoever hosts and resells the capacity 1
2. A bill that would give that regime permanent statutory footing, the Remote Access Security Act, passed the House 369-22 in January and awaits the Senate
5. The friction already lives at that layer: Singapore's home affairs ministry says its investigation into Megaspeed sought information from Supermicro and received "limited cooperation", which Supermicro disputes, saying it has been responsive
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For Nvidia, the legal China business has already been repriced: customers headquartered in China and Hong Kong brought 21.9% of revenue in the quarter ended April 2025 and 8.2%, or $7.88 billion of $96.22 billion, in the quarter ended July 2026, and the company says export rules leave it "effectively foreclosed" from China's data-centre market 5. What is at risk now is the part the filings cannot count: Reuters has identified more than $3.2 billion in Chinese data-centre projects and equipment deals built around restricted H100, H200 and H800 chips, without establishing how the hardware arrived, and Strider's analysis traced the $3.6 billion in state money into technology projects, including data centres that received Nvidia chips, though it did not establish that the Chinese military actually used that computing power
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2. China has dismissed the espionage claims as "pure fabrication"
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The four-year record reads as a design specification for the next control round: verify resellers, audit hosts, licence rentals. Washington spent those years writing lists of who may not buy a chip. The MSS campaign was a two-year demonstration that the operative question was always who would rent one out.
References
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ProvenBrief (2026). "China's MSS ran a secret two-year campaign to obtain banned AI chips, NYT investigation finds." ProvenBrief. https://provenbrief.com/story/china-s-mss-ran-a-secret-two-year-campaign-to-obtain-banned-ai-chips-nyt-investi
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