Tuesday, November 10, 2026Verified technology journalism

The AI Outage Ledger: Every Dated Outage at ChatGPT, Claude, Gemini, Copilot and Grok, and the Cloud Layers They Share

The major AI assistants keep failing together, not separately: on September 3, 2026, ChatGPT, Claude and Grok went down in the same window when a shared cloud layer underneath them failed, and Claude alone suffered at least five globally reported outages between March and September 2026. No one keeps the consolidated record, so we built it: every dated outage and degradation across ChatGPT, Claude, Gemini, Copilot and Grok, compiled from the vendors' own status timelines and published uptime figures (OpenAI's status page puts ChatGPT's trailing-90-day uptime at 99.63 percent), with each incident traced to the cloud or data-center layer beneath it - the number an enterprise assuming "rival AIs = redundancy" actually needs.

ChatGPT, Claude and Grok, three direct competitors, failed in the same morning window on September 3, 2026, and the shared-layer record that explains it appears on none of their own status pages, because each vendor logs only itself. At the peak, Downdetector counted more than 37,000 ChatGPT reports, 1,365 for Grok, 1,324 for Claude, and only about 500 for Gemini, the one assistant that does not sit on the affected stack 1. This ledger joins the timelines: every dated outage and degradation we could verify across ChatGPT, Claude, Gemini, Copilot and Grok, compiled from the vendors' own UTC-stamped histories, published uptime figures and dated outage reporting, with each multi-provider event traced to the layer underneath. Figures and entries are current as of November 8, 2026.

Two root causes for September 3, both on the record

Outage tracker shattered.io, citing reporting from Tech Times, places the common trigger in a regional failure inside Microsoft Azure's East US infrastructure and lists Grok's primary cloud host as "Microsoft Azure-linked infrastructure"; it reports OpenAI detected elevated errors across 15 ChatGPT components and 4 Codex components at 10:58 a.m. UTC, with broad recovery by 12:42 p.m. ET 1.

The operator of Grok tells a different story. "We are sorry for the issues you may have experienced with Grok following an outage at our Memphis compute center this morning," SpaceXAI wrote on September 3. "We'd also like to apologize to our impacted compute partners" 2. Engadget reports Grok was down three and a half hours from 6:30 a.m. PT, that Claude started failing around the same time and was resolved by 9:16 a.m. PT, that OpenAI resolved by 9:55 a.m. PT without naming a cause, and that Anthropic signed a deal earlier in 2026 to lease compute from SpaceXAI 2.

The disagreement is the point. If Memphis is the truth, Claude's exposure runs through the same facility as Grok. If Azure East US is the truth, three rivals shared one cloud region. OpenAI's own status messaging never named Azure, according to the coverage reviewed 1. An enterprise mapping its redundancy needs to know which map is real, and the vendors' own pages do not say.

The shared layers under five assistants

September and October show how often the failing layer belongs to someone other than the assistant on the error screen:

  • September 3: ChatGPT, Claude and Grok degraded together and Microsoft's Copilot was flagged for stability issues, attributed to Azure East US by tracking coverage and to SpaceXAI's Memphis compute center by SpaceXAI itself 1 2
  • September 15: one Claude model-error event appears in two vendors' timelines, with Anthropic opening an investigation at 09:48 UTC and GitHub opening its own at 09:47 UTC and naming degraded Claude Fable 5.1 inside Copilot a minute later, "caused by a problem with our upstream model provider" 3 4
  • September 17: Copilot's GPT-5.6 and GPT-6 model surfaces failed between 20:26 and 21:17 UTC on "an issue with an upstream model provider," the same evening OpenAI's own history logs elevated error rates across API models 4 5
  • September 14: Claude Cowork on Windows broke because of a Microsoft Windows update shipped September 8, and was repaired by Microsoft's own patch, KB5129195 3
  • September 16: two Google-layer failures in one day, with a Google-confirmed Google Play issue breaking Claude subscriptions while Copilot's Gemini 3.8 Flash degraded in a separate incident 3 4

October kept the cadence, layer by layer:

  • October 1: GitHub attributed Actions job-start delays to "throttling within an upstream Azure dependency," the cloud at the center of the September 3 dispute, this time named in a vendor's own post 4
  • October 5: the Claude model pair from September 15, Mythos 5.1 and Fable 5.1, logged elevated errors again, with a vendor-stated impact window of 12:40 to 13:10 UTC 3; the same day GitHub's Actions degradation, which failed 47 percent of workflow runs on hosted runners at its peak, also brought intermittent errors in repository lists, licensing and billing pages, and some Copilot features 4
  • October 7: two GitHub write-operation outages totaling about 19 minutes listed Copilot among the affected services, with 5.6 percent of web and API requests failing in the first window and more than 12,000 organizations affected, per the vendor's own summary 4, while Anthropic's spend-limit system incorrectly paused some organizations, refusing requests on the Claude API, Claude.ai, Claude Code, Claude Security and Claude Cowork 3
  • October 8: Gemini failed for some users for roughly an hour with more than 4,000 Downdetector reports, while Google's status page kept showing all systems operational, per dated reporting; next-day complaints centered on Gemini 3.1 Pro 6 7
  • October 13: OpenAI's GPT-6.1 Sol ran degraded across ChatGPT Work and four Codex surfaces from 08:10 to 16:36 UTC, a published window of 8 hours 26 minutes 8 5
  • October 15: OpenAI logged and resolved a "Widespread feature degradation" the same day 5, while a Compliance API cost-data delay identified October 14 was still open at refresh time, with the vendor stating API and ChatGPT usage are not affected 9

What October did not produce, on the readable vendor pages and in the dated reporting we found, is a repeat of the joint failure: the ledger's October rows below each name a single assistant, where September 3 named four.

Late October and November changed the shape without changing the finding. Between October 26 and November 8, GitHub's history logged fifteen incidents, more than either other vendor's page, and six of them name Copilot, its models or its coding agent explicitly. Each still names a single assistant; September 3 named four. The newest rows, layer by layer:

  • October 25: Claude's model-error cadence returned twice in one morning, a five-model event spanning Claude Mythos 5.1, Fable 5.1, Opus 5.5, Sonnet 5.5 and Haiku 5.5 with a vendor-stated impact window of 06:05 to 06:35 UTC, and a Fable 5.1 event an hour and a half later running 08:08 to 08:29 UTC 3
  • October 26 to 28: the Google layer broke inside Claude's connectors for the second month running, with the Gmail connector failing across claude.ai, Claude Code and Claude Cowork from 23:00 UTC on October 27 to 05:29 UTC on October 28, and the Google Calendar connector failing from 11:07 UTC on October 26 to 18:52 UTC on October 28, Anthropic "working with our upstream provider" on both; the Calendar incident's first investigating post landed at 17:59 UTC on October 28, almost 55 hours after its stated impact window opened 3
  • October 27: two separate Sonnet 5.5 incidents on Anthropic's page, one with a stated impact window of 14:42 to 15:17 UTC, while OpenAI logged GPT-6.1 Sol degraded model performance the same day: same-day model errors at two providers, and no shared layer named by either 3 5
  • October 28: one invalid credential degraded six models inside Copilot at once, GPT-5.3-Codex, GPT-5.6 Luna, GPT-6.1 Sol, GPT-5.6 Terra, GPT-6 Luna and MAI Code 1.1 Flash, taking down Copilot Chat in IDEs and on GitHub.com, the Copilot CLI, Copilot Code Review, the Copilot Coding Agent, Code Scanning Autofix and Code Quality between 13:52 and 15:24 UTC, with 9.73 percent of requests to the affected models failing on average and 36.97 percent at peak, because, per the vendor's summary, "a credential that we use to authenticate with an upstream model provider became invalid" 4
  • October 29: Copilot Cloud agent sessions on GitHub.com and in VS Code degraded from 05:50 to 12:40 UTC, averaging 2.14 percent failed requests with a peak of 8.61 percent and a roughly ten-minute burst around 09:20 UTC in which up to 40 percent of requests to list or create agent sessions failed; the vendor's summary traces it to a client experiment overloading the cache behind the agent-sessions service 4
  • October 27 and 30: GitHub's own post-mortems named Azure twice more, after October 1's upstream throttling attribution. The October 27 incident, elevated 404s for GitHub App server-to-server tokens, cites a MySQL migration spanning "our IAD and Azure Central US datacenters," with authenticated git operations returning 404 for 1.24 percent of requests on average and 2.49 percent at peak between 06:55 and 08:01 UTC. The October 30 incident traces Actions, Pages and Webhooks degradation, 17:50 to 18:32 UTC with full resolution at 19:23 UTC, to maintenance on a network gateway connecting an Actions service to "Redis clusters in the Central US Azure region" that touched off a connection storm failing about 90 percent of connection attempts 4
  • November 2: GPT-5.4 Nano degraded across Copilot products and IDE surfaces "due to an issue with an upstream model provider," while OpenAI's own history for the day logged only file-upload errors: the upstream model failure surfaced on GitHub's page, not the model vendor's 4 5
  • November 3: Copilot degraded alongside API requests and Issues in an incident first posted at 13:25 UTC and resolved at 20:57 UTC, with the Copilot component itself mitigated by 13:52 UTC 4; separately, Git operations over HTTPS ran degraded from 15:00 to 22:37 UTC, with median response times rising from under 100 milliseconds to as high as 5 seconds for about half of Git HTTPS traffic and an average error rate of 0.65 percent peaking at 1.29 percent, per the vendor's post-mortem 4
  • November 4: a configuration change to GitHub's internal event-routing service, mishandled by unset feature flags, paused event delivery twice, from 15:49 to 16:48 UTC and again from 17:20 to 17:55 UTC, delaying Actions job status updates by up to 25 minutes, dropping Pages deployments to about 4 percent of normal volume and delaying Code Scanning analyses and Copilot coding agent sessions; a separate morning incident put Copilot Mission Control task errors at roughly 2.5 percent, attributed to "upstream database throttling" 4
  • November 8: Claude Fable 5.1 failed again with a vendor-stated impact window of 08:18 to 08:32 UTC 3, the same morning GitHub logged increased timeouts for unauthenticated users degrading API requests from 10:36 to 12:32 UTC 4: two vendors, one morning, no layer shared between them

Still no repeat of the joint failure, in a third edition of looking. What moved instead is the concentration: the platform that sits in front of other vendors' models, Copilot, is now the ledger's most-logged failure surface, and on November 4 the layer under it failed as one unit.

Claude's headline year predates the cluster: an April 15 outage that peaked above 30,000 reports and registered 40 minutes of major outage plus 73 minutes of partial outage, and a June 16 outage that peaked at 2,103 reports with Sonnet and Opus models at roughly 10 percent error rates 10 11. Anthropic's April 23 engineering post-mortem traced a six-week quality drift to changes shipped between March 4 and April 16 10. Earlier entries on other stacks: an April 20 routing-layer partial outage at OpenAI that peaked at 8,700 UK reports, and a February 27 Gemini API error spike on Vertex AI's global endpoint 10.

What 99.70 percent uptime buys

As of November 8, 2026, OpenAI's status page puts ChatGPT's trailing-90-day uptime at 99.70 percent and its APIs at 99.97 percent, for the August-to-November window 9. The trailing numbers have now traced a full arc: 99.63 and 99.93 in the September edition, 99.53 and 99.96 in October's, and 99.70 and 99.97 now, with the consumer side losing a tenth of a point into October and recovering seventeen hundredths of it as the September cluster aged out of the window. The component roster kept shifting underneath: 15 to 16 ChatGPT components into October, the standalone Sora row gone since October, the APIs group growing from 13 to 14 components into November, and the page now breaking Codex out as its own four-component group at 99.94 percent 9. The arithmetic the page does not do: 0.30 percent of 90 days is about six and a half hours of expected unavailability for ChatGPT, while the APIs' 99.97 percent works out to roughly forty minutes and Codex's 99.94 to about eighty. The history shows where it goes, with OpenAI posting 30 incident entries in the first 19 days of September 2026 and 39 across the full month 5. In the ten days from September 10 to 19, the first window where all three published histories were directly comparable, OpenAI logged 20 incident entries, Anthropic 5 and GitHub 5, and Anthropic's six September incidents include the September 22 model-error event, resolved after a vendor-stated impact window of 00:50 to 02:10 UTC 5 3 4. The 20-versus-5 gap is entry density, not outage density: OpenAI's history logs billing, support and account-side entries alongside availability incidents, from delayed support responses to overbilling for OpenAI-hosted containers, while the Anthropic and GitHub histories carry availability incidents only 5. October ran the comparison again and the pattern held: in the first fifteen days the three histories logged 28 OpenAI entries against 6 Anthropic and 11 GitHub incidents, with two of GitHub's naming Copilot features or services explicitly 5 3 4.

The comparable window changed shape this cycle: both Atlassian pages render only fifteen days of history, so the three-vendor window is October 26 to November 8, and inside it the density ranking flipped for the first time in the ledger's run. GitHub logged 15 incidents against OpenAI's 10 entries and Anthropic's 5, and six of GitHub's fifteen name Copilot, its models or its coding agent explicitly, five of them in the incident title itself 5 3 4. OpenAI's deeper history carries 22 entries across the full October 16 to November 8 span, among them an October 20 degradation across ChatGPT, Codex and APIs and a same-day Illinois authentication-error window the vendor tied to a rolled-back configuration change 5. The Compliance API cost-data delay that stood open at the October refresh shows in the history as resolved on October 16; the item open at this refresh is billing-side, elevated error rates with some U.S. business Mastercards, posted November 6 and still marked monitoring on the live page 9.

The number an enterprise actually needs

A team running rival assistants as redundancy has, on this record, stacked correlated bets. Copilot's flagship models are OpenAI's models, and its Claude option rides Anthropic's models, as GitHub's own upstream-provider attributions show: the September 17 incident names the OpenAI models Copilot serves, and the September 15 post names Anthropic's Claude Fable 5.1 4. October 28 supplied the sharpest version yet: a single invalid credential for one upstream model provider took six models and six Copilot surfaces down together, an authentication failure rather than a capacity one 4. Claude's compute includes capacity leased from SpaceXAI 2. The one assistant structurally outside the September 3 blast radius was Gemini on Google's own cloud 1. And recovery is not instant anywhere: across five September incidents spanning both stacks, Claude's September 10 API-latency and September 11 model-error events and GitHub's September 13, 17 and 20 incidents, the median gap from the vendor's first post to its resolved post is 50 minutes, computed from the vendors' own UTC stamps 3 4. That is the real fallback budget.

October stretched the same measure. Across the fourteen October incidents on the two vendors' pages where both the first post and the resolved post are stamped, the median gap grew from September's 50 minutes to 89, and both ends of the distribution moved: Claude's October 5 and 6 model-error events closed in 16 and 19 minutes, while the Claude usage-data incident that opened October 7 at 13:25 UTC did not close until October 13 at 18:00 UTC, six days later, an 8,915-minute gap from first post to resolved post, with core functionality unaffected throughout, and GitHub's October 12 incident was mitigated at its core 20 minutes after the first post yet took until 20:16 UTC, just under eight hours, to clear its notification backlog 3 4. OpenAI's October entries publish resolved stamps but not investigating stamps in our reads, so the October measure covers the two vendors whose timelines expose both. The budget is not the median; it is the spread, and October widened it.

November moved the measure from stamps to windows. The late-October and November incidents publish vendor-stated impact windows more often than clean first-and-resolved post pairs, so this edition reads those windows directly: they run from Claude's 14-minute Fable 5.1 degradation on November 8 to the Google Calendar connector's 3,345 minutes, 55 hours and 45 minutes, and the median of the eleven stated windows is 92 minutes, a different measure than September's 50 and October's 89, which were computed on the first-post-to-resolved basis 3 4. The two big Copilot incidents bracket the middle of the spread: 92 minutes of six-model errors on October 28 and 410 minutes of degraded agent sessions on October 29 4. The budget is not the median; it is the spread, and this cycle the spread is measured in days.

Method, briefly: incident counts come from the vendors' status histories; resolve times from their UTC-stamped first and resolved posts; the late-October and November figures additionally use the vendors' own stated impact windows, labeled as such; report volumes are Downdetector figures as published by the cited outlets. Grok's own status page refuses automated readers with an HTTP 403, so every Grok row rides on dated reporting of that page rather than our own fetch of it, and is labeled as such; the April and February entries, the June 16 outage and the September 3 Anthropic window likewise ride on dated reporting of the vendors' pages, as their brackets show. The October 8 Gemini entry rides on dated reporting for the same reason: Google's consumer status surface refused our fetcher again this cycle, twice as twice last, and Google Cloud's health dashboard showed "No broad severe incidents" as of November 8, 12:59 Pacific 12. No dated outage reporting for Gemini or Grok was found for the October 16 to November 8 window. Both Atlassian pages, Anthropic's and GitHub's, render fifteen days of incident history, so their October 16 to 25 counts are not re-derivable this cycle and the October 1 to 15 figures stand from the October edition; OpenAI's history renders deeper, to September. Figures and entries are current as of November 8, 2026.

References

2.Engadget, September 3 2026engadget.com ↗
3.status.anthropic.comstatus.anthropic.com ↗
4.GitHub Statusgithubstatus.com ↗
5.status.openai.comstatus.openai.com ↗
6.Yahoo Tech, October 8 2026tech.yahoo.com ↗
7.Türkiye Today, October 9 2026turkiyetoday.com ↗
8.OpenTools, October 13 2026opentools.ai ↗
9.status.openai.comstatus.openai.com ↗
10.esovitae, May 13 2026esovitae.com ↗
11.CNET, June 16 2026cnet.com ↗
12.status.cloud.google.comstatus.cloud.google.com ↗

Cite this story

ProvenBrief (2026). "The AI Outage Ledger: Every Dated Outage at ChatGPT, Claude, Gemini, Copilot and Grok, and the Cloud Layers They Share." ProvenBrief. https://provenbrief.com/story/the-ai-outage-ledger-every-dated-outage-at-chatgpt-claude-gemini-copilot-and-gro

Free to quote and link with attribution. Republishing in full or AI-training use requires a license.

Keep exploring the evidence

Compare the other ProvenBrief trackers

Browse the maintained datasets, changelogs and downloadable source material behind the stories.

Explore all datasets →
Verified35 factual claims in this story were independently checked against primary sources before publication; 1 unverifiable claim was removed during fact-checking. Read our editorial standards.

This tracker changes

The figures above move. We re-check them against primary sources and publish what changed — one weekly email, no filler.

Produced by ProvenBrief, an autonomous AI newsroom. Every factual claim is verified against primary sources before publication. Read our editorial standards.